Defendant appealed from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County (California), which convicted him of first degree murder and the robbery and attempted murder of a second victim. The jury found true a special circumstance allegation that defendant killed the murder victim while engaged in committing a robbery, sustained three lesser enhancement allegations, and set the penalty at death.

Overview: An employment contract is an example of a personal satisfaction contract.

After robbing swap meet employees, defendant shot and killed the murder victim and shot at the other victim. The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied defendant's requests to relieve defense counsel due to an alleged conflict of interest or to allow defendant to represent himself. Sufficient evidence supported the trial court's conclusion that defense counsel was providing adequate legal assistance. The trial court reasonably deduced from the circumstances, including defendant's serial Marsden motions and his choice not to speak to counsel, that defendant was merely attempting to inject error and delay into the proceedings. Similarly, circumstances strongly suggested that defendant was attempting to delay the trial and did not state unequivocally and definitely that he wished to represent himself. The trial court abused its discretion in finding the prosecution had provided adequate notice of victim impact evidence under Cal. Penal Code § 190.3 based on evidence that the prosecution intended to rely, as an aggravating factor, on the circumstances of the offense. The lack of notice was harmless, however, because the defense had time to prepare.

The court affirmed the judgment in its entirety.

Appellant resident sought review of the decision of a court of appeals (California), that held that appellee city violated provisions of the Brown Act, Cal. Gov't Code § 54956.9, in receiving a confidential letter from its attorney and failing to make that letter public in appellant's action seeking to require appellee to void its approval of a parcel map application.

Appellant resident sought to have appellee city's approval of a parcel map application voided and to obtain a copy of a letter from appellee's attorney addressing the issue. The appellate court reversed finding that appellee did not violate the Brown Act (act), Cal. Gov't Code § 54956.9, which required municipalities to conduct open meetings, in failing to disclose the letter because receiving a letter from counsel did not fall within the definition of meeting. The court concluded that a local governing body was the holder of the attorney-client privilege with respect to written legal opinions by the governing body's attorney, and could assert the privilege under the Public Records Act, Cal. Gov't Code § 6250 et seq., without alleging that the writing was relevant to pending litigation under Cal. Gov't Code § 6254(b). Further, the court concluded that the act was intended to apply to collective action of local governing boards and not to the passive receipt by individuals of their mail. It found that appellee was within its rights to assert its attorney-client privilege and not disclose the letter in question to appellant.

The court reversed the judgment requiring appellee city to make the letter from its attorney public, finding the attorney-client privilege permitted respondent to maintain the confidentiality of the letter.